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This article seeks to provide a theoretical account of how management-
based regulation (MBR), a new regulatory style used by many global
regulators, affects its targets. The article centers on a case study. It
introduces agencement heory as the theoretical heuristic to inform the
analysis of a global, large-scale MBR scheme, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision's Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Program
(ICAAP). In agencement heory, agency is understood in a neomaterialist
frame. The core idea is that an actor's actions are determined by the
material assemblage that constitutes her. The agencement heuristic allows
ICAAP to be conceptualized as a regulatory agencement scheme. The scheme
seeks to affect its targets-banks-by choreographing and shaping the socio-
technical agencement processes under which the banks emerge as actors
capable of cognizing and acting on risks. Consequently, the impact of MBR
is mediated through actor construction. Regulation fosters actors whose
socio-techniical makeup leads them to have particular behavioral
proclivities. The article also discusses the philosophical implications of
moving to regulatory agencement and the schemes relationship to neoliberal
regulation.
INTRODUCTION
A. The Trouble with Management-Based Regulation
Management based regulation (MBR) refers to a set of "new
governance techniques"' that "involve] firms developing their own
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process and management system standards, and developing internal
planning and management practices designed to achieve regulatory or
corporate goals."2 The regulatory style is often used, for example, in
industrial safety, pollution prevention, food safety,3 banking regulation,4
and, although often unacknowledged, in corporate governance, in
particular if the regulated entities are heterogeneous, making one-size-
fits-all solutions ineffective; if the regulatory outcomes are difficult to
assess;5 or if a sufficient political consensus for the adoption of hard law
measures is unattainable.6 Although many MBR schemes are local, the
regulatory style seems to be rapidly proliferating on a global scale.
Many global administrative law bodies have adopted an MBR
approach;7 for example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development8 has produced works that advocate such an approach.
1. See, e.g., Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: 'New Governance' Techniques and
the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1037 (2012) (arguing that the post-financial crisis
experience demonstrates the need to understand the refractive effects of the
organizational, technical, and cognitive dimensions of regulatory governance); Sharon
Gilad, It Runs in the Family: Meta-Regulation and its Siblings, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 485
(2010) (proposing that, in times of regulatory uncertainty or ingrained noncompliance,
meta-regulation will likely be more advantageous than other forms of process-oriented
regulation); R. A. W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44
POL. STUD. 652 (2002) (arguing that self-organizing networks complement markets as
governing structures for allocating resources and exercising control and coordination);
Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of
Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIs. L. REV. 591 (2010) (arguing,
through the use of case studies, that emerging fields require policymakers to adopt new
governance regulations that combine the best state-centered and self-regulatory forms of
governance).
2. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Organizational Trust and the Limits of
Management-Based Regulation, 43 LAW & Socy REV. 865, 865 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public
Policy, in RISK AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 163-65
(OECD ed., 2010).
4. See generally IRIS H-Y CHIU, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IN BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2015)
(discussing the role internal controls in banks and financial institutions have in meeting
enhanced regulatory expectations and serving governance functions in the overall
financial regulation agenda).
5. See Coglianese, supra note 3, at 168-69.
6. See SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 7 (1984).
7. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 'Law' in Global Administrative
Law, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (2009) (examining various concepts of the law to analyze global
administrative law and how it impacts both national and supranational bodies).
8. See Coglianese, supra note 3, at 3.
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A burgeoning literature has emerged on the topic in recent years.9
Theoretical accounts are, nevertheless, few, and a rigorous description
of the regulatory style remains elusive. Scholars, for example, have
struggled to locate the theme in the existing regulatory theory
landscape.10
In the most elaborate account of MBR I know," Cary Coglianese
and Evan Mendelson try to pinpoint the characteristic features of MBR
by deploying a four-attribute tool designed for the analysis of regulatory
schemes. The tool focuses on (1) the regulatory target, (2) the regulator,
(3) the command, and (4) the consequences of noncompliance to "offer
the potential for creating a clearer categorization of different types of
regulatory approaches."'12 The authors' analysis shows that two of the
four attributes-target and consequences-follow traditional patterns in
MBR, but the regulator and command attributes do not. As to the
9. See generally Lori Snyder Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A
Valuable Tool in the Regulatory Tool Box?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 51-86
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006) (discussing the effectiveness of
management-based regulation while developing a model of how to most efficiently utilize
management-based regulations); Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation
and Self-Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146-64 (Robert Baldwin
et al. eds., 2010) (discussing meta-regulation and self-regulation as alternatives to the
traditional regulation form); Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 2; Christine Parker,
Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 207-37
(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that legal meta-regulation could hold
businesses accountable by protecting the procedural and substantive rights of customers,
employees, local communities and other relevant stakeholders); MIA MAHMUDUR RAHIM,
LEGAL REGULATION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Samuel 0. Idowu & Ren6
Schmidpeter eds., 2013) (demonstrating a meta-regulation approach to legislation by
linking social values to economic incentives and disincentives, thereby indirectly
influencing corporate governance to adopt corporate social responsible principles in
managing their self-regulated responsibilities).
10. Compare Matthew D. Adler, Regulatory Theory, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 590 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010) (adopting a welfarist
perspective to survey disparate issues concerning the justification for regulation and its
appropriate design), with Solomon, supra note 1 (utilizing the theme of "blurred
boundaries" to provide an overview, and ultimately advocate, a new approach toward
regulation).
11. Serge Taylor's prescient 1984 study on environmental impact statements foreruns
my arguments both on the peculiar nature of MBR and the impact channel MBR has.
Taylor argued that US regulators deployed the environmental impact statement (EIS)
strategy to overcome a political impasse that made a wide-ranging incorporation of
environmental concerns into hard law impossible. TAYLOR, supra note 6. The EIS strategy
forced the U.S. authorities to entrench environmental concerns in project assessment
procedures and, thus, strengthened environmental protection without the introduction of
new command-and-control rules. Id. at 5-6.
12. Coglianese & Mendelson, supra note 9, at 149-50.
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regulator, the schemes lack a single regulator, utilizing, instead, a
double-regulator arrangement. State authority triggers the regulatory
process, identifies the regulatory problem, and co-opts private actors to
draft the final rules. As to the command, MBR commands are
nonstandard, as the state does not issue direct behavioral norms. The
command is, instead, a metalevel directive that forces private actors to
"develop plans aimed at solving [the identified] problem and then the
target responds by developing its own internal regulations."' 13
I think that Coglianese and Mendelson's account falls short in one
crucial respect: it does not account for the peculiar manner in which
MBR impacts its targets. Most regulatory schemes seem to work
through establishing norms, which affect the targets' behavior by
prescribing, proscribing, or incentivizing particular conduct.'4 Fiona
Haines has conceptualized the issue as the "law/practice gap"1 5: all
regulation will always encounter a reality that is removed from the
rules, and the rules are only effective if translated into social norms that
in reality guide behavior. Empirical evidence I report in this Article,
however, suggests that MBR does not work like this. The schemes do
not prescribe, proscribe, incentivize, set rules, or even trigger internal
rule-making. Instead, the schemes target and mold management
practices or even a "corporate conscience" within the regulatory
subjects, 16 thus overcoming the law/practice gap.
B. Objectives and Structure
The article has four intertwined objectives. First, Part I introduces
the reader to a global, large-scale MBR scheme: the Internal Capital
Adequacy Assessment Program (ICAAP).17
13. Id. at 150.
14. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 128-34 (Tony
Honor6 & Joseph Raz eds., 1991) (discussing the asymmetry inherent in authority that
both lends a moral superiority to rules while also providing for suboptimal results from
over enforcement); see also ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC
THEORY (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2004) (providing a law and economics overview of
regulatory channels).
15. FIONA HAINES, GLOBALIZATION AND REGULATORY CHARACTER 29 (2005); see also
Fiona Haines, Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of
the Aftermath of Disaster, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 35 (2009).
16. See Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 2, at 866; Parker, supra note 9; Colin
Scott, Speaking Softly Without Big Sticks: Meta-Regulation and Public Sector Audit, 25
LAW & POLLY 203, 213 (2003).
17. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (BCBS),
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A
REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (2006) (providing a comprehensive
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Second, Parts II and III theorize what ICAAP rules do using
agencement theory, a neomaterialist conception of economic agency.
Here, all actors are understood as socio-technical assemblages of
"human bodies [...], prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices,
[and] algorithms."'8 The assemblages matter: what the actor will do and
how are determined by her constitutive socio-technical assemblage. In
Part IV, agencement heory is used to theorize the ICAAP project. The
article will argue that ICAAP is a regulatory agencement scheme in
which regulators try to affect bank behavior by influencing the socio-
technical assemblages banks are made of. My contention is that MBR
schemes are best understood as regulatory agencement: the schemes
often haltingly and imperfectly seek to impact the regulatory targets by
manipulating the socio-technological assemblages that make up the
targets' agency.
Third, the reconceptualization of MBR has theoretical
repercussions, which are detailed in Part IV. The contention is that
MBR in fact disrupts the philosophical and ethical foundations
underlying modern regulatory and legal theory. In particular, the
schemes perform and enact an idiosyncratic understanding of
subjectivity. The target subjects are not ready-made autonomous
subjects-as is the case in other regulatory styles-but, rather, objects
amenable to manipulation and construction by regulators. This
fundamental discrepancy leads to a number of ethical concerns.
Fourth, Part V discusses the ironic relationship between regulatory
agencement and regulatory neoliberalism. ICAAP was an integral but
thoroughly ironic part of a neoliberal as-little-as-possible regulatory
strategy. In its zeal to minimize the impact of regulations, the drafters
of ICAAP devised a regulatory approach that penetrates and
manipulates the regulatory subjects at unprecedented depths to allow
for their unhindered, free action on deregulated markets. The article
closes with a short conclusion.
framework to ensure the capital adequacy of internationally active banks through a
system of three "pillars," the second of which prescribes supervision to ensure compliance
and control).
18. Michel Callon, Why Virtualism Paves the Way to Political Impotence: A Reply to
Daniel Miller's Critique of The Laws of the Markets, ECON. Soc. EUR. ELECTRONIC
NEWSL. (MAX PLANCK INST.), Feb. 2005, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Callon, Virtualism].
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I. THE INTERNAL CAPITAL ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
A. ICAAP Background
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has produced
a global set of rules applicable to internationally active banks since
1988.19 In the beginning of the Basel process, the Basel I rules20
contained a simple capital-adequacy regulation scheme. Banks were
required to hold a minimum capital buffer of 8 percent of their risk-
weighted assets.2 1 In a long line of subsequent reforms, the standards
have evolved into an expansive complex, with scores of advanced
capital-requirement calculation methodologies and multiple regulatory
strategies and targets.
MBR entered the Basel scene in the 1996 Market Risk Amendment
(MRA).22 Under the MRA Internal Models Approach (IMA), advanced
banks gained the authority to use the proprietary value-at-risk models
to determine minimum capital requirements.23 At first, MBR served a
complementary role, acting primarily as a safeguard against potential
abuses of banks' new modeling authorities. In the 2004 Basel II
reforms,24 however, the strategy matured as the Committee introduced
the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Program.
Currently, the ICAAP is in limbo. The original program proved
conceptually unsound and practically flawed as the financial crisis
wreaked havoc on the Basel risk technologies.25 BCBS, nevertheless,
reasserted that "a thorough and comprehensive internal capital
adequacy assessment process [remained] a vital component of a strong
19. See, e.g., CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A
HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974-1997 (2011). Although the Basel Accords are non-
binding, they are regularly implemented in adopting jurisdictions. See, for example,
DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL CAPITAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2014); Maximillian L. Feldman, The Domestic Implementation
of International Regulations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 401 (2013); Narissa Lyngen, Basel III.
Dynamics of State Implementation, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 519 (2012), on the current state of
U.S. implementation.
20. See BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS (July 1988).
21. Id. 44.
22. See BCBS, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS
at Part B.2 (Jan. 1996).
23. See BCBS, AN INTERNAL MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS 4-6 (Apr. 1995); see also id. at Part B.
24. BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17, at
748-49.
25. See BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, at 9 (July 2009).
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risk management program."26 Despite the continuing commitment and
significant revisions,2 7 the fundamental collapse of risk-measurement
technologies and the reconsideration of the regulatory significance of
quantitative risk measurement28 will necessitate rethinking ICAAP
while simultaneously posing considerable challenges to its future
development.
B. What Does ICAAP Do?
1. Three Systems
The ICAAP objective is "not only to ensure that banks have
adequate capital to support all the risks in their business, but also to
encourage banks to develop and use better risk management echniques
in monitoring and managing their risks."29 How do the ICAAP rules
seek to do this? In short, banks are required to build three structures
under the ICAAP. These are (1) risk-measurement systems, (2) a risk-
data processing system, and (3) a system of management controls.
2. Risk Measurement
Risk-measurement systems constitute the bedrock of the Basel MBR
project. The anatomy of the project is simple. First, the rules identify a
long list of banking risks. These are credit risk, market risk, operational
risk, counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk, banking-book interest rate
risk, and strategic risk.
30
Second, the rules offer a semimandatory, relatively high-level
blueprint for the construction of a risk-measurement system for each of
the risks. The rules, then, demand that the banks build such systems
and meet the quality standards set in the blueprints. The systems are,
once ready, subject to constant inspection and review.
31
26. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S
HANDBOOK: BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS (2015), for recent U.S. implementation actions.
27. See BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 25.
28. See BCBS, THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: BALANCING RISK SENSITIVITY,
SIMPLICITY AND COMPARABILITY (July 2013).
29. BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17, 720.
30. See BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17, 732-
42.
31. See id. 744-55.
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To understand the scope of the project, consider a credit rating
system.32 Credit rating systems are very complicated entities.33 First,
banks collect or procure massive amounts of past default data.34 Second,
analysts conduct statistical analyses to identify risk factors that
borrowers with similar past default rates share.35 Third, once the risk
factors are known, the analysts allocate credit grades to past borrowers
with similar features and calculate a yearly default rate for each grade.
Fourth, the default rate data allow the bank to transit to a probabilistic
future. If ten out of a thousand borrowers in a grade have defaulted
each year during a ten-year period, the bank may deduce that the
borrower probability of default (PD) for the borrowers in the grade is
one percent.36 Finally, the new PD data can be used as an input in
value-at-risk models. The probability distribution of future credit losses
becomes calculable.37
Building the rating system is no small feat. It requires significant
infrastructure investments in data collection and warehousing,
computing infrastructure, and human resources.38 The systems are
costly to run and maintain. Only enormous piles of paper and countless
management structures, process flowcharts and task descriptions,
complicated oversight and audit arrangements, and elaborate validation
procures keep the systems together.39
The rating systems, nevertheless, constitute only a part of the
required credit-risk measurement system. Adequate credit-risk
measurement systems allows a bank to transcend the rating systems'
grassroots-level focus on individual exposures and their PDs, and
develop an understanding of what the risks in its portfolio are as a
whole. In the "less advanced" banks, the ICAAP rules require, for
example, banks to build stress-testing processes.40 At the more
32. Credit risk arises when a bank extends a loan to a borrower. If the borrower ends
up in arrears, the bank may, ultimately, be forced to write down the credit.
33. See generally Michel Crouhy et al., A Comparative Analysis of Current Credit Risk
Models, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 59 (2000) (showing the complexity of credit rating systems).
34. See, e.g., BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND
CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17,
462.
35. See, e.g., id.
36. See id. 1 447.
37. See BCBS, AN EXPLANATORY NOTE ON THE BASEL II IRB RISK WEIGHT FUNCTIONS
(July 2005).
38. See e.g,, DIMITRIS N CHORAFAS ECONOMIC CAPITAL ALLOCATION WITH BASEL II.
COST, BENEFIT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES 24 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Ian Wilson, Implementing Basel II. A Case Study Based on the Barclays
Basel II Preparations, 12 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 297, 297 (2004).
40. See BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17, 738(ii).
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advanced banks, the system, "at a minimum, should cover four areas:
risk rating systems, portfolio analysis/aggregation,
securitisationcomplex credit derivatives, and large exposures and risk
concentrations."
41
ICAAP requires that all relevant banking risks be addressed with
similar systems. For market risk, banks must, for example, build risk-
measurement methodologies "that enable them to assess and actively
manage all material market risks, wherever they arise, at position,
desk, business line and firm-wide level."42 In technical terms, banks are
instructed to build quantitative market-risk models, similar to the IMA
models used for binding capital requirement calculation. The physical
and human-resource investments are, again, huge. Banks must
assemble data feeds, computing infrastructures, and hire quantitative
analysts to develop the complicated algorithms. While the other risks
receive a far less nuanced and detailed treatment under the ICAAP, the
basic principle remains:43 banks are required to develop and run
complicated technical systems.
3. Data Processing
The second ICAAP complex deals with processing the resulting
avalanche of risk data. It is important to note that, while the risk
measurement systems conduct important preprocessing work, they
nevertheless do not yet determine how the bank will understand its
position or what action it will take. Risk-data production must be
augmented with data processing.
Data processing takes place in two separate processes. First, the
board and senior management must engage in an analytical process
that situates the risks the bank faces in relation to the capital resources
available to the bank. The rules, for example, provide that bank
management is "responsible for understanding the nature and level of
risk being taken by the bank and how this risk relates to adequate
capital levels,"44 and task the management with "[t]he analysis of [the]
bank's current and future capital requirements . . . ."45 The postcrisis
41. BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17 § 733, at
206.
42. Id. § 738, at 207.
43. See e.g., BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND
CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17,
739-742.
44. Id. § 728, at 205.
45. Id. § 729, at 206.
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Basel II.T5 additional ICAAP guidance provides more detail.46
Management has to develop an integrated view of the risks across
organizational silos and also understand the correlations,
concentrations, and interplay of risks taken in all quarters of the
bank.
47
Once the analytical process is finalized, the bank is required to use
the resulting risk awareness for planning its future strategy. Bank
management is directed to formulate a "strategic plan [that] clearly
outline[s] the bank's capital needs, anticipated capital expenditures,
desirable capital level, and external capital sources."48 Bank boards
receive another mission. They are to set the bank's "tolerance"49 or
"appetite"50 for risk (i.e., to articulate how much the bank is willing to
lose in a few bad cases to make a desired level of profit under most
circumstances).
4. Action Systems
The third aspect of ICAAP attempts to ensure that banks can act on
its forward-looking understanding of risk. The rules direct the board to
"adopt and support strong internal controls and written policies and
procedures and ensure[...] that management effectively communicates
[the policies] throughout the organisation." Further, the board is to
"ensure that management establishes [...] a method for monitoring
compliance with internal policies."51 In short, the bank must have a
management system that allows the high-level actors to exert control
over the bank-its functions, units, and subunits, down to individual
employees.
The postcrisis Basel 11.5 guidance provided more details. Under the
new rules, the banks must for example have "detailed policies that set
specific firm-wide prudential limits on the principal risks relevant to a
46. See BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 25, at 9-27.
47. See RBI's MASTER CIRCULARS, PRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES ON CAPITAL ADEQUACY
AND MARKET DISCIPLINE-NEW CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK § 12.3.3.2 (2011),
available at httpJ/taxguru.in/rbi/rbis-master-circulars-dated-172011-prudential-guidelnes-
capital-adequacy-market-discipline-capital-adequacy-framework-ncafhtml; see also BCBS,
ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 25, at 13-14.
48. BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, supra note 17 § 729, at
206.
49. Id. § 730, at 206.
50. BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 25 § 14, at 12.
51. Elisabetta Gualandri, Basel III, Pillar 2: The Role of the Banks' Internal Control
Systems, in CRISIS, RISK AND STABILITY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 71, 78 (Juan FernAndez de
Guevara Radoselovics & JosA Pastor Monsdlvez eds., 2012).
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bank's activities."52 The "policies and procedures should provide specific
guidance for the implementation of broad business strategies."
5 3
Further, the policies, procedures, and limits must
1. "clearly delineate accountability and lines of
authority across the bank's various business activities,
and ensure there is a clear separation between business
lines and the risk function";
2. escalate and address breaches of internal
position limits;
3. provide for the review of new businesses and
products by bringing together all relevant risk
management, control and business lines to ensure that
the bank is able to manage and control the activity prior
to it being initiated; and
4. include a schedule and process for reviewing the




Agencement is a social science concept that seems to be slowly
gaining traction in economic sociology,55 but is still unknown in
regulatory theory. The concept has its roots in actor-network theory
56
52. BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 25, at 13.
53. RBI's MASTER CIRCULARS, supra note 47, § 12.3.3.4.
54. Id.
55. See generally Brice Laurent, The Politics of European Agencements: Constructing a
Market of Sustainable Biofuels, 24 ENVTL. POL. 138 (2014) (introducing agencements as a
lens to study the construction of a market in sustainable biofuels and for the analysis of
European integration); Philip Roscoe, 'Elephants Can't Gallop': Performativity, Knowledge
and Power in the Market for Lay-Investing, 31 J. MARKETING MGMT. 193 (2015) (using
agencements to examine lay-investment in financial markets by the general public as a
practice performed by marketing knowledge); Dean A. Shepherd & Kathleen M. Sutcliffe,
The Use of Anthropomorphizing as a Tool for Generating Organizational Theories, 9 ACAD.
MGMT. ANNALS 97 (2015) (showing that anthropomorphizing, a concept similar to
agencements, must be used under specific conditions to develop successful theories in
organization studies).
56. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL 204-18 (2005) (arguing that
that the abbreviated nature of speech for more routine situations is simply an actor-
network for which there is no new information required); ACTOR NETWORK THEORY AND
AFTER (John Law & John Hassard eds., 1999) (exploring the tension central to the notion
435
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and Deleuzian philosophy.57 Michel Callon first introduced the concept
in 200558 to make sense of economic actors.
Agencement in French has two meanings. First, it denotes an
assemblage, a collection of objects arranged into a functional entity.59
Second, it denotes the process of becoming an actor or an agent60 -in
English, perhaps, "agentification." The commingling of the two
meanings, assemblage and agentification, opens up the core neomaterial
idea of agencement: agency, or "who or what cause[s] the action,"6' can
only be understood as an arrangement of things.62 Thus, actors are
"made up of human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment,
technical devices, algorithms, etc."63
The idea of materially determined agency leads Callon to his main
point: if economists and sociologists want to understand how economic
agents make decisions, they have to pay attention to the assemblages
that the actors use, often unconsciously, to enact and perform
themselves.
Although Callon's examples all concern human beings, the approach
can be extended to account for nonhuman actors. As Callon himself
writes, "[a]gency... can be attributed to heterogeneous and unexpected
entities which are not necessarily human beings ... *"64 This is exactly
what lain Hardie and Donald MacKenzie did in a 2007 ethnography of a
of an actor-network theory that combines structure and agency into an intentionally
oxymoronic term); Rolland Munro, Actor-Network Theory, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
POWER 125, 125 (Stewart R. Clegg & Mark Haugaard eds., 2009)(introducing key ideas
about power within the nexus of "actor-theory" thought, hoping to shift the nature of
society away from an anthropocentric legacy and return to social and cultural contexts).
57. See generally Stephen Legg, Assemblage/Apparatus: Using Deleuze and Foucault,
43 AREA 128 (2011) (discussing the Deleuzian concept of assemblage and agencement
through Agamben's and Deleuze's reflections on Foucault's use of the term
dispositif/apparatus).
58. See Callon, Virtualism, supra note 18.
59. See John Phillips, Agencement/Assemblage, 23 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y 108
(2006).
60. See Cdric Calvignaca & Franck Cochoya, From "Market Agencements" to
"Vehicular Agencies" Insights From the Quantitative Observation of Consumer Logistics,
19 CONSUMPTION MARKETS & CULTURE 133, 134 (2015).
61. Michel Callon, Economic Markets and the Rise of Interactive Agencements: From
Prosthetic Agencies to Habilitated Agencies, in LIVING IN A MATERIAL WORLD 29, 33
(Trevor Pinch & Richard Swedberg eds., 2008) [hereinafter Callon, Economic Markets].
62. Callon, Virtualism, supra note 18, at 4.
63. Id.; see also LATOUR, supra note 56, at 201 (discussing how there are many non-
human "ingredients" that make up agents). See generally N. KATHERINE HAYLES, How WE
BECAME POSTHUMAN: VIRTUAL BODIES IN CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE, AND INFORMATICS
(1999) (describing how information lost its body, that is, how it came to be conceptualized
as an entity separate from materials forms).
64. Callon, Economic Markets, supra note 61, at 34.
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hedge fund.65 The study uncovered that the fund's agency was a
function of, for example, the physical office layout, computer and display
setups, partners' cognitive strengths and weaknesses, their roles in
sense-making processes, work flows, mental and material information-
processing devices, material calculative devices, and e-mails. All these
things were conducive to and codeterminant of the action the fund
took.66
III. ICAAP As REGULATORY AGENCEMENT
A. A Theoretical Move
The theoretical move I make in this article is to deploy the concept
of agencement as a heuristic to analyze the Basel ICAAP rules. Within
this heuristic, the relation of seemingly disparate elements becomes
clear. The idea of agencement allows us to understand how ICAAP and
MBR work and to conceptualize what BCBS intends to do with the
ICAAP rules. The rules choreograph and guide the processes under
which banks construct the socio-technical assemblages they need for
becoming coordinated actors.67 Regulation affects the targets' behavior
by manipulating the agencements that determine behavior.
I will try to sketch the outlines of the ICAAP regulatory agencement
project. My contention is that ICAAP contains two parallel but separate
agencement projects. The first project attempts to ensure that banks
have appropriate distributed-risk cognitions capable of producing an
appropriate situational risk awareness. The second agencement process
seeks to guarantee that banks have a control system capable of
mobilizing their risk awareness.
B. Banks as Distributed Cognitions
The idea that cognition is distributed is one of the core intellectual
foundations of agencement heory.68 The idea was introduced by Edwin
Hutchins in an ethnographic study of navigational practices onboard a
large U.S. Navy ship. Hutchins argued that, even if navigation was
often understood as an activity performed by an individual human
65. lain Hardie & Donald MacKenzie, Assembling an Economic Actor: The Agencement
of a Hedge Fund, 55 SOC. REV. 57 (2007). For an extension of the same approach to steel
plants, see Dan Swanton, The Steel Plant as Assemblage, 44 GEOFORUM 282, 283 (2013).
66. Hardie & MacKenzie, supra note 65, at 60-73.
67. A similar approach to administrative' agencies was introduced in Jennifer Nou,
Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015).
68. Callon, Virtualism, supra note 18, at 3.
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being, on the ship the cognitive task in fact was in fact undertaken by a
complicated cognitive machinery distributed through space and time to
multiple humans and an immense amount of physical and theoretical
infrastructure. This prompted Hutchins to argue that cognitive work is
always a collective effort that mobilizes a wide variety of different
actors, some human, some physical, others hybrids.69 There is no pure
thought or cognition inside human brains; rather, thought extends and
folds the outside into itself.70 Thus, navigation was possible only if
navigational charts and the enormous resources, physical equipment,
work hours, and theories that go into them were integrated with
observations by trained lookouts, countless alidades, hueys, sliders,
chart tables, and other instruments, and the strictly regulated work
flows and clearly delineated tasks and responsibilities of the navigation
team members. In the terms of actor-network theory, Hutchins's study
revealed that cognition is performed in socio-technological networks,
which often reside outside human brains.71
My contention is that banks are very much like the Navy ship in
Hutchins' study; they contain distributed cognitions purpose-built to
navigate risks. Banks, as collectives, try to identify what the bank's risk
position is, where they are headed, and what they must do to achieve
certain outcomes and avoid others. Again very much akin to
navigational work on ships, the cognitive work banks do is undertaken
in complicated assemblages of humans, physical things, and
technologies. A single human or even a team of humans would not be
able to make sense of the risks any more than a navigator, standing
alone, could navigate a treacherous passage.
Thus the idea that banks contain distributed risk cognitions opens
up an understanding of the first aspect of the ICAAP agencement
project. The rules seek to ensure that banks develop functional
distributed risk cognitions that produce risk awareness conducive to the
stability of the bank.
The ICAAP regulatory distributed risk cognition is a function of two
interwoven assemblages: the risk-measurement and risk-data
processing systems. Should we adopt a zoomorphic metaphor, the risk-
measurement system constitutes the bank's sensory system, its eyes
69. See EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD xiii (1995) (describing how the
context of cognitive activity is "not a fixed set of surrounding conditions but a wider
dynamical process of which the cognition of an individual is only a part.").
70. See Gordon L. Clark, Myopia and the Global Financial Crisis: Context-Specific
Reasoning, Market Structure, and Institutional Governance, 1 DIALOGUES HUM.
GEOGRAPHY 4, 8 (2011).
71. See, e.g., Tetsuya Kono, Extended Mind and After: Socially Extended Mind and
Actor-Network, 48 INTEGRATIVE PSYCHOL. BEHAv. 48, 48 (2013).
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and ears, while the data processing assemblage, made up of the board
and senior management, constitutes the bank's nervous system.
The two assemblages are tightly interwoven. The technological
makeup of the risk sensory system is codeterminant of the outcomes of
the cognitive work the "risk brain" undertakes. Thus, it is important to
note that the rules on risk-measurement systems do not only impose an
obligation to build such systems, they also engage and regulate the
banks on an ontological plane. The risk measurement systems prime the
bank to perceive-and thus to enact and perform-risks in a very
particular way.
As an example, imagine two identical banks using different
approaches to credit risk modelling. One is using a Merton-Vasicek
model, the other the Poisson-process-based CreditRisk+.
72 Although the
models share basic features,73 the resulting understandings of the
banks' position will likely differ as the numbers the systems feed to the
banks' cognitive assemblages are different. The differences will likely
result in divergent behavioral responses. The sensory technologies thus
inevitably affect how the cognitive agencements will understand their
surroundings, conditioning the subsequent behavioral responses, albeit
with diffuse and underdetermined effects.
74
The risk-data processing agencement directs behavioral outcomes
primarily through framing.75 The rules constantly force the data
72. The Merton-Vasicek models are credit value-at-risk models in which the default
probabilities and correlations constitute the key model parameters. The CreditRisk+
models, instead, use an actuarial science framework while struggling with correlations.
See e.g., Crouhy et al., supra note 33.
73. See Crouhy et al., supra note 33, at 62.
74. See Donald MacKenzie & Yuval Millo, Constructing a Market, Performing Theory:
The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange, 109 AM. J. SOc. 107, 140
(2003); see also Donald MacKenzie, An Equation and Its Worlds: Bricolage, Exemplars,
Disunity and Performativity in Financial Economics, 33 SOC. STUD. SCI. 831 (2003)
(analyzing the history of the fundamental equation of modern financial economics: the
Black-Scholes (or Black-Scholes-Merton) option pricing equation); Donald MacKenzie, Is
Economics Performative? Option Theory and the Construction of Derivatives Markets, 28 J.
HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 29 (2006) (examining the theory of options from the viewpoint of
performativity); Donald MacKenzie & Taylor Spears, 'A Device for Being Able to Book
P&L" The Organizational Embedding of the Gaussian Copula, 44 Soc. STUD. SCI. 418
(2014) (speculating that all widely used derivatives models help generate inter-
organizational co-ordination); cf. DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA. How
FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE MARKETS (Wiebe E. Bijker, W. Bernard Carlson, & Trevor
Pinch eds., 2006) (describing how the emergence of modern finance theory has affected
financial markets in fundamental ways: as an engine that shapes them rather than a
camera that reproduces their every detail).
75. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 ScI. 453 (1981) (discussing the effects of frames on
preferences).
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processing assemblage towards a restrictive and normatively loaded
capital-adequacy frame. The banks are, for example, required to become
aware of the risks in relation to capital adequacy, possible capital
adequacy challenges, and the ways in which those risks can be managed
and counteracted with capital adequacy plans. The desired risk
consciousness is solidified by requiring the bank to produce an endless
flow of documented reflections and plans that deal with capital-
adequacy concerns. The rules thus direct the banks' attention: the
actors in the cognitive agencements are forced to become infatuated
with capital adequacy. The stratagem seems to entrench a particular
organizational sensibility by inundating the bank's distributed risk
cognitions with prudentially geared tasks and data. When prudential
calculations, assessments, and plans become a part of the banks'
organizational fabric and immersed into all decision-making routines,
imprudent choices become impossible, the regulators seem to hope.
C. One Actor
The ICAAP prudential mission requires that the situational risk
awareness is mobilized to affect and condition the bank's actions. The
rules seem to assume that the mobilization will be anything but an easy
task. The assumption is that banks are made up of a network of
independent actors-business line management, credit officers, credit
committees, and even individual traders-all with divergent
understandings of risk, incentives, and interests. The challenge the
BCBS faced was to ensure that banks subjected that diversity to the
single risk awareness and to force the plural bank to pursue a concerted
risk strategy as one entity. To accomplish the task, the rules sketch out
a complicated set of action-oriented control and coordination devices
designed to subdue the potentially unruly actors.
The control devices can be divided into three categories. The bank
must establish (1) controls, processes, and procedures; (2) policies; and
(3) limits. The devices differ in the techniques they use to affect the
independent risk actors within the banks.
Controls, processes, and procedures replicate the everyday
hierarchical organizational accountability practices used in banks. The
objective is to ensure that banks are coordinated bureaucratic
organizations. The rules require the bank to put in place elaborate
procedures to govern who or what is capable of taking what risks, how
decisions are made, and how they are reviewed. Thus, the devices seek
primarily to guarantee that the banks have the organizational capacity
to script prudent work flows. The devices however, retrace familiar legal
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patterns. They regulate the actors much like traditional command-and-
control regulation does: by imposing external behavioral requirements.
Policies, by contrast, do not do so. Instead, they seem to affect the
actors' cognitive frames, prescribing some action in certain
circumstances, but often leaving the actors some room for maneuver and
improvisation. Consider a credit policy; the policy allocates authority to
extend or decline credit to different actors. A credit officer may, for
example, approve applications of a certain maximum size to customers
whose credit scores exceed a set threshold. The policy might also
articulate pricing terms as a function of credit scores. It is important to
note two issues. First, the policy does not script action. It determines
the frame in which action is planned and strategized, priming certain
action, but not forcing it. Second, policies are important tools in
homogenizing cognition within the bank. Without a credit policy, each
credit officer would be left to perform credit risk as a function within her
individual agencement, perhaps conditioned and shaped by past
training or experience. This would lead to the performance of multiple
credit risks within the bank. However, once a policy is imposed on the
actors, the ontology of credit is-at least partly- homogenized within
the bank.
Limits similarly set the ontological frame for their target's cognitive
work. However, the effects are less determinate, as limits often only
determine the outer bounds for action. For example, a trading position
value-at-risk limit provides a trader a target ontology by which to assess
the risks she takes, but constrains her actions inside this ontology by
restricting the amount of value-at-risk capital she may jeopardize.
D. What Does Agencement Do?
What do regulatory agencement and ICAAP do in banks? How do
they affect banks? I want to make two provisional points.
First, we must take seriously the regulatory target. The ICAAP
rules target banks and its constitutive collectives, not humans. This
leads humans to occupy an idiosyncratic position: they are cogs and
bolts in the socio-technical cognitive and control assemblages. Whatever
behavioral rights and obligations humans are assigned, they are
instrumental. The obligations manipulate the socio-technical
agencements that come into being when humans are integrated and
merged with other material and immaterial things. Consequently, it
seems, in regulatory agencement he humans are regulatory targets in
the same way as physical resources and technologies. Humans must
exist and they must be arranged with other things and function as the
regulators wish for the bank to have the desired agency.
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This leads me to my second point. The philosophical change
underlying the transition to regulatory agencement is fundamental.
From an anthropomorphic position, there seems to be no option but to
conceptualize regulatory agencement as subjectivity regulation.
Regulatory agencement seeks to consciously and purposely affect
behavior by manufacturing actors with appropriate subjectivities. In a
cybernetic frame,76 which might seem a more apt conceptual space,
particularly in the ICAAP context, we would be talking about
appropriate cyborgs and cyborg regulation.
Agencement theory-like all actor-network theories-allows for
polymorphic agency. As Callon noted, humans are agencements. In the
current frame, the humans in banks could well be subjected to
regulatory agencement analysis as well. This has three implications.
First, when, for example, the ICAAP rules require bank management o
view "the analysis of a bank's current and future capital requirements
in relation to its strategic objectives as a vital element of the strategic
planning process,"77 the rules are trying to change the targets'
subjectivity. The schemes program humans by assigning
psychomorphs78 that may change the socio-technical assemblages that
constitute her. It is important to note the aberrant impact channel. The
regulatory idea is not to establish a network of external motivational
factors, but to assure that the humans internalize certain socio-
technical assemblages and make them part of their psychological make-
up. Second, the technical assemblages agencement schemes attach to
humans should not be discounted. Callon argued that humans assume a
cyborg existence79 once treated in the agencement frame. This seems an
apt description for the humans that are parts of the bank data
processing systems. Third, the point could be taken even further. For
example, the agency of a CEO, essentially, appears to be augmented,
extended, and changed by the risk-measurement and management
systems that allow her to cognize the risks she manages. Thus, the
agencement approach seems to open up interesting views into how
ordinary regulation works on its subjects-an understudied subject.
76. See generally PHILIP MIROWSKI, MACHINE DREAMS: ECONOMICS BECOMES A
CYBORG SCIENCE (2002) (describing cyborg science as it relates to economics).
77. See BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPREHENSIVE VERSION, SUPRA NOTE 17, 729.
78. LATOUR, supra note 56, at 212-13.
79. Callon, Virtualism, supra note 18, at 4.
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IV. AGENCEMENT AS A LEGAL STRATEGY
A. The Crucial Difference
Above I argue that the ICAAP rules-and consequently MBR-
engages in regulatory agencement. This diagnosis has important
interrelated theoretical implications.
My contention is that regulatory agencement reflects a novel and
philosophically disruptive approach to regulation. The approach
unsettles the basic imaginary of how liberal regulation works. The main
difference from other modes of regulation is found in the way regulatory
agencement schemes treat their subjects.
The core point is that, in regulatory agencement schemes,
regulators consciously and purposely choreograph and institute
processes that affect the way subjects perform and enact themselves. In
the mainstream liberal legal imaginary, however, the entire notion
seems impossible. The specific impact channel of regulation suppresses
the subjectivity effects that regulatory interventions may have. Legal
regulation is mediated by rules, or norms, and the rules do not
penetrate their subject. For example, Fredrick Schauer's narrative
illustrates the point: in his imaginary, rules act as "reasons for action."
80
This means that rules establish external demands upon individuals on
how they should behave. Consequently, the rules encounter free,
rational beings, capable of choosing how to act and only intervene in an
overt and express fashion.8 ' Regulations command, sanction, and
incentivize, but, what is essential, always leave the choice whether to
comply with its subject, internalized norms excluded. From a cognitive
perspective, this means that the subject is assumed to have a cognitive
process to which regulation is purely external and which regulation does
not seek to affect. Perhaps the best way to frame the issue is to use the
influential language of law and economics: legal commands and
interventions establish incentives, but they do not aim to change the
individual's preference function. The primacy of the subject leaves her
in a superior position in relation to law. She may choose to ignore law
and its commands. She has her own rationality.
The issue of whether regulation is external to its subjects'
subjectivity has been rarely conceptualized in the existing literature.
Some hints of emerging problematization options may be found in the
postmodern critiques of the liberal legal paradigm. For example,
80. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES. A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 73 (Tony Honor6 & Joseph Raz eds.,
1991).
81. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 50-52 (2nd ed. 1999).
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feminist,8 2 postcolonial83 and black84 studies inspired by Foucault85 and
Butler86 have argued that the liberal paradigm has a blind spot. The
liberal paradigm, however, suppresses the possibility that legal
normative power is in fact complicit in producing its subjects.
For example, Nicola Lacey argues that "powerful discourses" such as
law are inherently subjectivizing and identity-creating. In the law of
rape, for example, "the way in which the definition of rape works ...
constitutes a subject position into which the rape victim is inserted...
."7 Alan Hunt provides a similar account: "It is by transforming the
human subject into a legal subject that law influences the way in which
participants experience and perceive their relations with others. Thus,
legal ideology provides a constituent of what Althusser called the "'lived
relation' of human actors."88
Nevertheless, even these critiques have only addressed relatively
passive regulatory subjectivity effects: the effects are inevitable but
suppressed consequences of liberal regulatory interventions. In
traditional regulation, the regulatory psychomorphs affecting the
construction of subjectivity are gestalts of identity and subjectivity
which law offers its subjects for adoption.8 9 No more. By contrast, the
specific kind of reflexivity of, and the intentional subjectivity
modification techniques deployed in regulatory agencement schemes
turn regulation from a passive-aggressive to an aggressive subjectivity
manipulator.
82. E.g., Nicola Lacey, The Constitution of Identity: Gender, Feminist Legal Theory,
and the Law and Society Movement, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY
471 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (examining contrasting dynamics and their implications
within current feminist scholarship).
83. E.g., EFRtN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL
AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO (2001) (arguing that
legal constructs and norms govern the struggle for the definition of a specific Puerto Rican
post-colonial identity).
84. E.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331
(1988) (arguing that antidiscrimination law has largely succeeded in eliminating the
symbolic manifestations of racial oppression, but has allowed the perpetuation of material
subordination of Blacks).
85. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Technologies of the Self, Seminar at the University of Vermont,
(Oct. 1982), in 1 ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 223-52 (Paul Rainbow ed., Robert
Hurley et. al. trans., 1997).
86. JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997).
87. E.g., Lacey, supra note 82, at 473.
88. Alan Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of
the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 11, 15 (1985).
89. For an account of the variegated dynamics of legal psycho-morph adoption in the
context of "dominance feminism" critiques see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redxs
Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
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Of course, regulatory agencement is by no means the first instance
of subjectivity manipulation by governments or public authorities. For
example, kindergartens, schools, and prisons are government-controlled
and regulated institutions that engage in subjectivizing and socializing
work. The relationship between these traditional government
subjectivity-production schemes and regulatory theory is strained. On
one hand, the subjectivity-production schemes have been traditionally
effectively isolated from legal and regulatory discourses. The frame is
administrative, not legal or regulatory. On the other hand, the schemes
always exist, at the very least, in the shadow of law, supported and
molded by it. This problem, however, goes beyond the scope of this
article.
B. Targeting the Subject Makeup
Consequently, the introduction of regulatory agencement raises
philosophical and ethical concerns. The questions are similar to some
identified by Robert Baldwin in relation to "nudging."90 Baldwin argued
that nudging circumvents the traditional rules-based regulatory impact
channel: it "involves structuring the choices that people make in order
to lead them towards particular outcomes."91 The strategy does not
impose specific external constraints on or incentives to appropriate
choices. Rather, nudging affects "the choice architecture" and,
consequently, works very much like regulatory agencement: it "alters
people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or
significantly changing their economic incentives."
92
In Baldwin's account, nudges come in three degrees of invasiveness
with respect to the autonomy of their targets.93 First-degree nudges are
mostly harmless: they "involve the supply of simple information to
individuals or the imparting of reminders."94 Second-degree nudges,
such default or opt-out choice structures, however, cut deeper into
target's "individual autonomy [...] since the targeted individual's
behavioral or volitional limitations and 'automatic' responses will in
practice lead him or her to accept the nudge with limited awareness and
reflection."95 Even if using strategies that minimize resistance, second-
90. Robert Baldwin, From Regulation to Behaviour Change: Giving Nudge the Third
Degree, 77 MOD. L. REV. 831 (2014).
91. Id. at 831.
92. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008).
93. Baldwin, supra note 90, at 835-37.
94. Id. at 836.
95. Id. at 836.
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degree nudges are relatively innocuous. Their targets may easily detect
being nudged. Effective, easy counterstrategies are also available: in the
case of opt-out organ donation, for example, a hesitant individual may
easily override the default option and check the box on the form to make
her a nondonor. Third-degree nudges are different. They employ
pervasive manipulation techniques that are hard to detect, evade, and
resist. Suggestive framing devices may be used to affect the decision-
making frames. Once a frame is in place, emotionally overpowering
techniques suppress the possibility of counterconduct. Imagine a dietary
nudging campaign. If a dietary choice is framed in terms of its effects on
the individual's sex appeal, the fear of becoming unattractive is likely to
overpower potential resistance.96
Nudging may be an efficient and useful regulatory strategy, but
Baldwin identifies a long list of problems with the technique. The last of
these originates from the idiosyncratic regulatory philosophy the
strategies mobilize. Baldwin points out that most traditional regulatory
tools "operate on quite different philosophical and ethical assumptions
from those that underpin nudge."97 Normal regulatory interventions
tend to build on the rationality of persons and firms -
they issue prescriptions that are overt because they take
it that people will use their rationality to react positively
to the threats of sanctions or taxes. Enforcement
practices tend to work on a rational deterrence basis,
and models such as the 'responsive regulation' approach,
treat regulated persons and firms as cognitively
competent responders to overtly issued messages.98
By contrast, nudging neither assumes nor respects the targets'
rationality and capability of informed choice. Instead, it targets and
exploits "the limited cognitive, volitional and emotional capacities of
individuals" and "use[s] these to advantage," often even operating by
stealth.99
Finally, Baldwin goes on to say that "[c]hoices have to be made
about the position that the state wants to adopt regarding targeted
individuals - is their autonomy to be respected and their rationality to
be openly worked with, or is their autonomy to be reduced and their
decision-making to be nudged by stealth?"100 Fundamentally, Baldwin
96. Id. at 836-37.




MAKING BANKs ON A GLOBAL SCALE
seems to be asking whether we should use nudging at all. In the end, he
remains agnostic.101 In either event, I suspect that this is the wrong
question in the first instance. Perhaps nudging and regulatory
agencement are not the philosophical problems; rather, the problem lies
in the mainstream liberal regulatory imagination.102 It may be that the
philosophy of free rational individuals is based on a fundamental
misconception of law's effects on its subjects. We might need an entirely
new theory of how regulation affects its subjects capable of
accommodating the subjectivity effects of traditional regulatory
schemes, nudging, and regulatory agencement.
Two things must, however, be kept in mind. The ethical concerns
Baldwin identifies in the context of nudging bear with even greater
force on regulatory agencement. First, like third-degree nudges,
regulatory agencement schemes treat their targets as incapable of
appropriate rational choices without regulatory intervention. There is
absolutely no respect for a pre-existing subjectivity or agency. To the
contrary, regulatory intervention is motivated precisely by the assumed
irrationality or flawed habits of its regulatory targets. The entire
endeavor is premised on the need of regulators to be involved to
compensate for the fact that the regulated lack the competencies
required for rational action. Second, compared to nudging, the invasions
of regulatory agencement are deeper. The schemes structure the
regulatory targets' decision-making processes much more pervasively
and effectively. Whereas nudging takes advantage of mechanisms that
correct perceived local rationality failures during fleeting events of
choice, the leitmotif in regulatory agencement schemes is to affect the
targets' cognitive make-up from the ground up, comprehensively and
permanently. In short, regulatory agencement schemes attempt to
hardwire and entrench cognitive structures that produce specific
behavioral patterns, not just to affect the choice architecture. In
addition, the cognitive agencement echniques may be hard to evade, in
particular if the processes are mandatory and backed up by effective
enforcement practices.
101. See id. at 857.
102. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, LAW AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: INTEGRATING THEORIES
OF REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS 695-706 (2015).
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V. NEOLIBERAL IRONIES
A. Two Faces of Neoliberalism
MBR seems a prime example of a neoliberal regulatory technique.
The ethical conundrum identified in Part IV, however, opens up a view
into the highly ironic and paradoxical neoliberal regulatory scheme. The
scheme inverts one of the core foundations of neoliberal regulation: that
the free interplay of free individuals brings about optimal outcomes.
Aaron Major's work on neoliberalism in the international financial
regulation context10 3 provides the backdrop for understanding the
ironies of MBR. Like many other commentators, Major argues that
international financial regulation has followed a neoliberal path for at
least three decades.10 4 After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
consensus, financial regulation, first, underwent a deregulatory phase.
Nation-states dismantled the obstacles to international capital
movements set up in the aftermath of the Second World War, and
simultaneously relaxed controls over domestic capital markets and
banking. The two moves effectively reinstated a global space for
unrestricted capital movements and initiated the development of
integrated global financial markets.105 The neoliberal deregulatory
frenzy, however, started to cool off during the 1990s. The deregulated
financial markets had not delivered on their promise. The markets were
unstable, prone to periodic blow-ups and crises. To "to maintain some
order over the global financial markets," the states reasserted their
power, engaging in re-regulatory reforms. The neoliberal paradigm
seemed to gain a neo-Keynesian flavor,10 6 embodying "a tension or
compromise between neoliberal and Keynesian principles."107
Major's thesis is that the neo-Keynesian flavor is largely illusory.
Despite the increasing intensity of the interventions, their form belies a
continuing neoliberal focus. Thus Major argues that neoliberalism, in
fact, has two faces. The neoliberal regulatory project not only engaged in
deregulation, but morphed to accommodate a re-interventionist
strategy.
103. Aaron Major, Neoliberalism and the New International Financial Architecture, 19
REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 536 (2012).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 538-39; see also, e.g., ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF
GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990s (1996).
106. See, e.g., Andr6 Cartapanis & Michel Herland, The Reconstruction of the
International Financial Architecture: Keynes' Revenge? 9 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 271
(2002); Wesley Widmaier, The Keynesian Bases of a Constructivist Theory of the
International Political Economy, 32 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 87 (2003).
107. Major, supra note 103, at 540.
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The neoliberal re-regulatory interventions have three
characteristics. First, they are depoliticized. Regulatory power is
transferred outside the national democratic processes, to loose
supranational networks of governmental functionaries and technocrats,
subject to little if any democratic accountability. The new actors often
have very close ties to private actors. Second, as the re-regulatory
processes lack democratic legitimacy, the new regulators justify the
rules by instituting quasidemocratic transparency processes and
appealing to technocratic expertise. Third and finally, Major argues, the
second face of neoliberalism is held together by the "increased policy
making autonomy and international cohesion of state finance ministries
and central banks" and the ensuing "intellectual consensus" favoring
free-market solutions.10 8 These three characteristics result in a new
kind of law. The interventions are carefully crafted to refrain from
interfering with the neoliberal status quo in the financial markets. The
objective is to minimize the impact regulation has on the regulated
activities. Principles-based regulation, risk-based regulation, and self-
regulation are all good examples of regulatory techniques that allow the
regulators to re-enter the scene while simultaneously effectively
refraining from impacting industry practices. 109
B. Irrational but Rehabilitable
Herein lie the ironies. The ICAAP rules are an integral part of the
neoliberal re-regulatory project. In fact, ICAAP was a harbinger of a
future where regulation would, perhaps, wither away. During late 1990s
and early 2000s, risk-measurement echnologies had developed to the
degree that even the regulators thought technological advancements
could one day make binding banking regulation obsolete.110 Banks
would be capable of independently assuring their own safety, as well as
108. Id. at 541-42.
109. For an overview of the new regulatory techniques-and their problems-see, e.g.,
Black, supra note 1.
110. Crouhy et al., supra note 33, at 62; see also FED. RESERVE Sys. TASK FORCE ON
INTERNAL CREDIT RISK MODELS, CREDIT RISK MODELS AT MAJOR U.S. BANKING
INSTITUTIONS: CURRENT STATE OF THE ART AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSMENTS OF
CAPITAL ADEQUACY (1998), available at http://www.federalreserve.govboarddocs
staffreports/study.pdf (outlining several potential uses of internal credit risk models);
Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle, Bank Capital Requirements for Market Risk- The
Internal Models Approach, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Dec. 1997, at 1,
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/97vO3n4/9712hend.pdf (presenting
an overview of the 1998 requirements that incorporated qualitative standards for a bank's
risk measurement system).
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the safety of the whole banking system, with internal capital adequacy
technologies."' ICAAP was pushing the banks towards that goal.
The project, however, simultaneously inverts the entire foundation
of the regulatory regime. Recall that deregulatory neohberahsm had
sought to liberate its autonomous, self-sufficient subjects. The goal was
to set the individuals free to pursue their own economic goals, and their
free interplay would lead to optimal outcomes. Once the markets were
deregulated, the ugly truth revealed itself. The actors were not exactly
rational." 2 Instead, they were greedy, uncoordinated, even clueless. The
regulators realized that the interplay of less-than-rational actors could
lead to a catastrophe if regulation were dismantled altogether. Thus a
new stratagem emerged. To allow for the as-hands-off-as-possible
neoliberal reregulation, the regulators jumped in and started
"encouraging" a particular form of rationality.
This is the first irony: the neoliberal regulatory scheme undermines
the core neoliberal dogma that self-interested actors should be left
alone. The strategy pushes another paradigm: if actors are left alone,
the market will fail. To prevent that, the actors have to be painstakingly
constructed with regulatory interventions to maintain the market.
Consequently, free banking can only exist, if the regulators can
somehow ensure that the actors perform a particular rationality and do
not engage-as seems to be their nature-in behaviors that are destined
to destabilize the markets. The second irony appears when we think
about the regulatory mechanisms that were chosen. To liberate the
actors from invasive regulation, regulation penetrates the actors to an
unprecedented depth. It enters the very fabric of actors, their cognitive
processes. Regulation conditions who and what the banks are.
CONCLUSION
A. Last Two Remarks
In this paper I have discussed ICAAP as an example of MBR. I used
the "agencement" concept as a theoretical heuristic to make sense of
how the ICAAP and, consequently, MBR schemes seek to change their
subjects' behavior. I argued that the ICAAP triggers processes where
the regulatory subjects are constructed and arranged out of human
bodies, technologies, physical infrastructures, and theories to become
111. See DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, ECONOMIC CAPITAL ALLOCATION WITH BASEL II: COST,
BENEFIT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES xxiv (2004).
112. John Bone, The Deregulation Ethic and the Conscience of Capitalism: How the
Neoliberal 'Free Market' Model Undermines Rationality and Moral Conduct, 9
GLOBALIZATIONS 651 (2012).
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"heterogeneous socio-technical assemblages" and, thus, engage in
regulatory agencement. The objective of the schemes is to entrench a
particular agency in the regulatory subjects and induce them to behave
in particular and predictable ways. Two last remarks remain to be
made.
B. Failures in the Making
First, regulatory agencement schemes, it seems, are always bound
to fail, at least in part. Their frailty is caused by the inevitable
complexity of the regulatory constellation. When regulators attempt to
choreograph complex agencement processes, they are faced with
daunting intellectual demands. To be successful, the regulators have to
understand what the existing agencement processes are, identify the
right modification techniques that will result in the desired behavioral
change, and devise effective implementation strategies. Simultaneously,
successful agencement requires that the targets' reactive behavioral
adjustments are foreseen and countered.
113
The ICAAP experience provides ample evidence of how and why
agencement schemes may fail. In essence, the original 2006 ICAAP was
built on two fundamental misunderstandings. First, the regulators
overestimated the banks' risk-measurement capabilities. The design
assumption was that banks could reliably quantify all financial risks
and produce a prudent risk awareness. The crisis postmortems proved
that hope unfounded. In particular, the core risk technology, value-at-
risk, was simply unfit for prudential use.
114 The approach produced
precise but distorted and misleading numbers on what turned out to be
essentially unquantifiable risks.115 In addition, the numbers from
different bank business units were siloed, while no adequate
technologies to reconcile them into a single risk awareness existed. 11
6 In
short, the regulators had banked on a wrong agencement. The risk
113. Of course, a regulator designing any regulatory intervention faces the same
challenges. In agencement, I think, the complexity of the regulatory techniques amplifies
the scope of the problem.
114. The irony is that the problems value-at-risk techniques had were well known since
at least 2002. See, e.g., Carlo Acerbi, Spectral Measures of Risk: A Coherent Representation
of Subjective Risk Aversion, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1505 (2002); Carlo Acerbi & Dirk
Tasche, Expected Shortfall: A Natural Coherent Alternative to Value at Risk, 31 ECON.
NOTES 379 (2002); Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Against Value-at-Risk: Nassim Taleb Replies to
Philippe Jorion, NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB'S HOME PAGE (1997), http://www.fooledby
randomness.comljorion.html.
115. Fin. Services Auth., The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global
Banking Crisis, at 44-45 (March 2009).
116. BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 25, at 10-11.
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technologies had not worked. Second, the rules also mischaracterized
humans. The 2006 ICAAP was based on a very optimistic idea that the
board and senior management were, by their nature, prudent, and
smart risk managers who could be easily co-opted to manage risks. The
financial crisis brought to light a very different breed of beings. The
bankers proved motivated only by self-interest, greedy, and often
clueless individuals who were more interested in maximizing their own
executive compensation awards than the survival of the institutions
they ran.
The postcrisis reforms have sought to ameliorate these short-
comings. The Basel 11.5 ICAAP and corporate governance reforms tried
to force better risk-measurement systems. Banker character failures
were addressed by, for example, instituting restrictions on
remuneration practices117 to mitigate the risks that bankers' disposition
to be greedy posed, and by strengthening the powers of risk-control
functions and chief risk officers to forge a central institutionalized
organizational risk conscience.118 In many jurisdictions, criminal law
has also made a comeback, sometimes, however, in perplexing
connection with further MBR. 119
Despite the inherent and inescapable difficulties of regulatory
agencement, regulators should, nevertheless, not banish the approach
from their arsenal. Regulatory agencement schemes have many
strengths. It is likely that many issues will effectively elude or defy
traditional regulation. In addition, the approach may often be the only
politically viable option. What should be kept in mind is that regulatory
agencement schemes are best used as parts of a regulatory mix that
meshes the techniques with, for example, command-and-control
regulation and economic incentives.120
C. Disrupting Natural Neoliberal Subjects
Second, while the Basel regulatory agencement project originally
constituted an extension of the neoliberal re-regulatory agenda, the
project carries the promise of postneoliberal and perhaps nonneoliberal
117. See BCBS, COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
(Jan. 2010).
118. BCBS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 25, at 13-14.
119. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN
BANKING: FINAL RULES (INCLUDING FEEDBACK ON CP14131 AND CP15/5) AND
CONSULTATION ON EXTENDING THE CERTIFICATION REGIME TO WHOLESALE MARKET
ACTIVITIES, 2015, CP15/22 (U.K).
120. The philosophy underlying agencement analysis, per se, is imperialistic and
universal. It would be possible to understand all regulation, even traditional command-
and-control regulation or criminal law, in terms of agencement.
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future. The crucial issue to note is that the adoption of regulatory
agencement suggests that the regulators treat the actors as artificial
entities and, consequently, malleable, devoid of a natural, preordained
agency. Economic agency is denaturalized.121 The actors are, instead, by
their nature artificial and political entities.
A recent initiative on climate change risk management in financial
institutions constitutes an excellent, yet still unfulfilled, example of
creative and, at least at first sight, nonneoliberal use of regulatory
agencement. The initiative suggests that climate change risk
should be expressly incorporated into Pillar 2's list of
material risks. This would provide an internationally
level playing field to guide bank risk officers and
regulators in assessing the portolio-level risks of bank
lending for environmentally sustainable and
unsustainable activities. This could potentially involve
regulators and risk officers developing, among other
things, exclusion lists, phase-out or phase-in targets for
certain types of activities (e.g. replace high-carbon assets
with low-carbon assets), and conduct impact screening -
both negative and positive - to develop a better
understanding of banks' risk exposure to
environmentally unsustainable activity.
122
As a result, a new plane for politics and regulatory intervention
appears. We may use regulation to arrange agencies that pursue
political agendas not captured by the imaginary of self-absorbent, ready-
made legal subjects.
121. See Hardie & MacKenzie, supra note 65, at 77.
122. UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE INST. FOR SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP, STABILITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY IN BANKING REFORM: ARE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS MISSING IN BASEL III?
20 (2014), available at http://www.cisl.cam.ac.uklpublications/pubhcation-pdfs/stability-
and-sustainability-basel-iii-fmal-repor.pdf.
